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I. INTRODUCTION
Most informed observers asked to describe the changes wrought in asylum
practices in Europe and North America during the 1990s could name dozens
of new legal provisions, rules, and programs designed to control the entry
and admission of asylum seekers into the advanced industrial states of the
West. None, however, could refer to even two or three systematic evaluations
of these changes.
Numbers? Yes, we know how many individuals apply for asylum, how
many are granted, and how many are denied. We also know that many asylum
seekers come from countries that have produced or continue to produce
significant numbers of Convention' refugees and people fleeing serious civil
disorder. What we don't know is just how well or poorly the asylum systems
in various countries or regions function. Do they protect the vast majority of
Convention refugees? What happens to those who are fleeing violent condi-
tions as opposed to persecution? Do the asylum systems deter abuses by
those with no claim to protection? With respect to economic migrants denied
asylum, are they returned? How seriously are smuggling organizations
penetrating the asylum system, and with what results? Does detention act as a
deterrent? When detention is used to ensure that asylum seekers appear at
their hearings, is it managed efficiently and humanely?
The asylum system of any country must accomplish two principal goals.
First, the system must protect those fearing persecution or serious danger
(civil conflict, serious human rights violations). Second, to maintain public
support for that first goal, the asylum system must deter abuse.
* Susan Martin is the Director of the Georgetown University Institute for the Study of International
Migration (ISIM). Andrew Schoenholtz is ISIM's Director of Law and Policy Studies.
1. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter
Convention].
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How have the asylum changes put into place this decade affected these
dual goals? Critics argue that changes such as safe third country and
expedited processing have seriously restricted the access of bona fide
Convention refugees to asylum. Many governments, on the other hand,
believe .that the new controls enable them to deter significant abuse.
The Workshop on Refugee and Asylum Policy in Practice in Europe and
North America was organized to facilitate a transatlantic dialogue aimed at
understanding just how well these asylum systems are balancing the dual
goals. The Workshop was convened by the Institute for the Study of
International Migration (ISIM) of Georgetown University and the Center for
the Study of Immigration, Integration and Citizenship Policies (CEPIC) of
the Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique, with the support of the
German Marshall Fund of the United States. It was held on July 1-3, 1999, at
Oxford University.
The workshop examined key issues as to the workings of the U.S. and
European asylum systems: decision making on claims, deterrence of abuse,
independent review, return of rejected asylum seekers, scope of the refugee
concept, social rights and employment, international cooperation, and data
and evaluation. In this opening paper, we explain the significance of these
issues and raise central questions about them.
II. IMPROVING DECISION-MAKING
Governments and NGOs have pursued four main avenues to improve
decision-making in asylum systems: developing the expertise of the adjudica-
tors; establishing accurate information on human rights conditions in most of
the world's countries; building the capacity to ensure that asylum seekers are
represented by competent counsel or other legal representatives; and issuing
guidelines to help adjudicators understand and approach certain categories of
asylum seekers, such as children.
A. Professionalization of the Decision-makers
For most of the advanced Western nations, signing the 1951 Refugee
Convention 2 or 1967 Protocol 3 did not immediately translate into an infra-
structure blessed with well trained, capable decision-makers, an efficient yet
fair process, and resources adequate for the challenges of asylum. Most
countries had their migration or border personnel in place to handle cross-
border movements. The idea of creating a specialized corps of professional
asylum officers came later.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Commit-
tee noted in 1977 that only a limited number of parties to the Convention or
2. Id.




Protocol had established procedures for the formal determination of refugee
status.4 The Executive Committee recommended two basic requirements
related to decision-makers. First, the Executive Committee called for the
regular immigration or border control authorities to refer asylum seekers to
higher-level decision-makers: "the competent official (e.g. immigration
officer or border police officer) to whom the applicant addresses himself at
the border or in the territory ... should be required to act in accordance with
the principle of non-refoulement and to refer such cases to a higher author-
ity."' 5 Second, decision-making in the first instance should reside with "a
clearly identified authority wherever possible a single central authority." 6
Governments have developed their adjudicatory staff in three ways:
recruitment, training, and specialization. Recruitment has been used in two
different ways. First, governments have used recruitment opportunities to
hire adjudicators with either appropriate educational backgrounds or work
experience in the field. For example, in developing the U.S. Asylum Officer
Corps in the early 1990s, the head of that U.S. office implemented a
nationwide recruitment drive.7
This type of recruitment often occurs as countries shift the asylum function
from border guards and immigration officers to an independent, dedicated
asylum corps. Such special asylum agencies exists in several of the major
European receiving countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and
Switzerland. 8 The French refugee office was one of the first such agencies,
established in the early 1950s.9 The Office for the Protection of Refugees and
Stateless Persons (Office Francais de Protection des Refugies et Apatrides)
(OFPRA) is attached to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who appoints the
director for a three-year term. The director is a senior official with at least five
years of experience in charge of an embassy or a consulate general.,o
Governments have also recruited significant numbers of adjudicators in
order to deal with ever increasing case loads. In 1989, for example, the
volume of applications prompted the French government to increase the staff
to some 400. Together with computerization, the additional staff resources
enabled OFPRA to issue decisions in months, rather than years, thereby
eliminating its refugee processing backlog.'l Other European governments
also staffed their asylum offices with considerable numbers of adjudicators
and administrative staff. In 1992, Germany's asylum staff numbered 3500,
4. See Executive Committee Conclusion No. 8: D etermination of Refugee Status, U.N. High Conm'r
for Refugees (UNHCR) 28th Sess., at 6 (1977).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 17.
7. Gregg A. Beyer, Establishing the United States Asylum Officer Corps: A First Report, 4 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 453,467 (1992).
8. See REBECCA WALLACE, REFUGEES AND ASYLUM: A COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE 7 (1996).
9. See id. at 84 n.4.
10. See Christopher Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making: The Systems of Ten Countries, 19 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 235, 290 (1983)
11. See WALLACE, supra note 8, at 84-85 n.4.
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Sweden's was 800, and the Netherlands' was 750.12 When the United States
first created an asylum corps in April 1991, it only hired 82 officers. Another
68 asylum officers entered service in March 1992, but it was not until 1994
that Congress appropriated funding for more than 150 additional officers.
13
Training of asylum adjudicators occurs in two different ways: an initial
course and regular in-service training. Upon recruitment, for example, U.S.
adjudicators attend a five-week Asylum Officer Basic Training Course.14 The
intensive program focuses on international human rights law, U.S. immigra-
tion law, decision writing, interviewing techniques, and country conditions
research. In addition to government experts, trainers include experts from
UNHCR and NGOs. Each of the seven Asylum Offices in the United States
has a Quality Assurance Training officer who addresses the in-service
training needs of particular offices, such as newly evolving events in a
particular country, or cultural information regarding a particular ethnic group
more frequently applying for asylum.15 Finally, as new legislation is passed
and guidelines are issued, asylum officers receive training on how to
implement these changes. 16
Training continues to be considered a crucial issue. Only recently, the
European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) issued procedural guide-
lines for refugee status determinations. ECRE recommends that all officials
who come in contact with asylum seekers receive appropriate training
necessary to recognize an asylum claim and refer the claim to the competent
authority. 17 With regard to decision-makers, training in asylum law and
relevant international human rights law should be coupled with training on
country condition information, cultural awareness, and sensitive issues such
as gender, torture, post-traumatic symptoms, and child development. 18 ECRE
also emphasizes the need for training on interview techniques, working with
interpreters, and analytical decision-making techniques. 19 Finally, ECRE
recommends that experts from UNHCR and NGOs should be consulted and
invited to participate in training programs, and that all training programs
should be evaluated.2°
Finally, specialization is another mechanism governments have used to
improve decision-making. Because OFPRA is located in one central office
(in Paris), officers specialize and acquire considerable expertise in particular
12. See Gregg A. Beyer, Reforming Affirmative Asylum Processing in the United States: Challenges
and Opportunities, in IMMIGRATION LAW: UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON ASYLUM
AND REFUGEE STATUS 43, 50 n.45 (AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y & Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. eds., 1994).
13. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ASYLUM REFORM: 5 YEARS LATER 9 (2000)
[hereinafter ASYLUM REFORM].
14. See id. at 10.
15. Seeid. at 10-11.
16. Seeid. at 11.
17. See EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES (ECRE), GUIDELINES ON FAIR AND EFFICIENT
PROCEDURES FOR DETERmINNG REFUGEE STATUS 135 (1999).
18. See id. 136.
19. See id. 9 137, 140.
20. See id. 142.
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regions or countries of origin.2' OFPRA officers review and propose a
decision on each application. Decisions proposed by officers are subject to
approval by the head of the particular geographic region and to review by the
director.2 2 For many years, decisions were normally taken based solely on the
written documents filed by the asylum seeker. Since 1993, OFPRA has been
holding interviews in the majority of cases.2 3
Many Western nations have professionalized their refugee determination
system. It would be useful to understand what approaches to professionaliza-
tion have worked best and what training models have been successful. This
information would be helpful not only to nations with developed asylum
systems, but also to those governments now building new systems.
B. Documentation Centers
One of the key human rights developments in the second half of the
twentieth century has been the documentation of conditions in most of the
world's countries. These records of human rights violations have become a
major source of information for asylum decision-makers where available and
used.
In 1992, UNHCR's Centre for Documentation and Research (CDR)
responded to an increasing need for current, reliable country-of-origin
information by collecting a full range of sources on country conditions and
human rights. In 1996, CDR published the first edition of Refworld, a
collection of databases, including databases on country conditions. The
databases come from international, governmental, and non-governmental
sources. CDR established information exchange agreements with documen-
tation centers in Canada, Switzerland, and the United States, as well as with
such NGOs as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, and the U.S. Committee for Refugees.
Refworld is available on the world wide web and on CD-ROM.24
Several states have developed sophisticated information centers. In Canada,
for example, the Immigration and Refugee Board's (IRB) Research Director-
ate provides adjudicators as well as the public with current and reliable
information related to human rights and refugee and migration issues.
Information is gathered from a variety of sources, including national and
international governmental and non-governmental organizations, human
rights monitors, academics, publications, and on-line news services. The
Research Directorate uses multiple sourcing to ensure that the information is
accurate, balanced and corroborated, and that the most comprehensive
picture possible is given of conditions in the countries of origin of asylum
21. See id.
22. See Avery, supra note 10, at 290-91.
23. See HELENE LAMBERT, SEEKING ASYLUM: COMPARATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE IN SELECTED EURO-
PEAN CouNTRIs 29 (1995).
24. See UNHCR, Centre for Documentation and Research: A Brief History, REFWORLD (7th ed.
CD-ROM 1999); UNHCR, Refworld: Country Information, REFWORLD (7th ed. CD-ROM 1999).
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seekers. The primary role of the Directorate is to meet the information needs
of the Convention Refugee Determination division of the IRB. The Research
Directorate's products and services are made available to the general public
through the Board's Resource Centre at Headquarters and four public access
Regional Documentation Centres.
In the United States, the 1990 reforms established a Resource Information
Center (RIC) to provide information on human rights conditions in countries
throughout the world. The RIC mainly assists the 300 asylum officers who
make domestic asylum decisions as well as the immigration and asylum
officers determining refugee status overseas for the U.S. resettlement pro-
gram. In response to requests from the field, RIC produces information
packets and reports on developments abroad, such as the Kosovo crisis, the
impact of Hurricane Mitch on Central America, the Shining Path in Peru, and
the re-emergence of social cleansing death squads in El Salvador. In addition,
RIC produces the biweekly News Summary for Asylum Adjudicators, a
compilation of news articles that address country, and topical information of
relevance to the asylum program.26 RIC-produced documentation is avail-
able to the public through two sources: the Human Rights Documentation
Exchange in Austin, Texas, and UNHCR's Refworld database.
The U.S. Department of State provides an additional source of country
information through its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Man-
dated by Congress,27 these reports are issued annually and cover internation-
ally recognized individual, civil, political, and worker rights, as set forth in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 8 Information for these reports
is gathered throughout the year from a variety of sources across the political
spectrum, including government officials, jurists, military sources, journal-
ists, human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists. The annual report
contains information on almost 200 countries and is included in UNHCR's
Refworld.
Another database included in Refworld is that developed by the Federal
Office for Refugees of Switzerland.29 The Country Information Sheets are
compiled in German and French by the Country of Origin Information Desk
of the Federal Office for Refugees. The countries described are selected
according to the number of asylum applications which have already been or
are expected to be submitted by nationals of those countries.
One of the pioneer centers in Europe is the Refugee Documentation Center
(Zentrale Dokumentationsstelle derfreien Wohlfahrtspflege fur Fluchtlinge)
25. See Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, The Research Program of the Immigration and
Refugee Board (visited Mar. 1, 2000) <http://www.cisr.gc.ca/research/about/index-e.stm>.
26. See ASYLUM REFORM, supra note 13, at 11-12.
27. The reports are mandated by sections 116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151 n(d)(1), 2304(b) (Supp. IV 1998), and section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C. § 2464 (Supp. IV 1998).
28. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/811 (1948).
29. UNHCR, Switzerland, REFwoRL (7th ed. CD-ROM 1999).
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(ZDWF), an independent center founded in 1979 and located in Bonn.30 The
ZDWF organizes and disseminates human rights information from govern-
mental and non-governmental sources, both national and international. The
ZDWF service is used by government officials, courts, and various organiza-
tions in Germany and other countries. Until quite recently, funding came
from the Ministry of Youth, Welfare, and Health, as well as from various
volunteer agencies in Germany.31 The Ministry experienced a serious short-
fall in 1998, eliminating all government funding to ZDVVF.32
With respect to these documentation resources, several issues need to be
assessed: whether and how these documentation centers have improved
decision-making; the credibility and utility of the information; and whether
and to what extent those making asylum determinations use the information
in a systematic fashion.
C. Representation
The asylum process in any state is very difficult to navigate for the
untrained, let alone for individuals who often do not speak the language of
the adjudicators and come from very different legal cultures. Moreover, the
law itself, with developments from gender-related claims to the Torture
Convention,33 is complex. Expertise on human rights conditions in many of
the world's countries is needed. In the United States, for example, claims are
made annually bearing on conditions in some 175 countries.
The data shows just how significant representation is, for example, in the
U.S. system. First, represented claims are much more likely to be approved
than pro se claims. In FY 1999, the immigration courts granted asylum
claims four to six times as often where the claimant was represented.34
Second, more than eighty percent of those who fail to appear at their hearings
lack representation.35
Many adjudicators .and practitioners believe that when aliens are repre-
sented in proceedings, cases move more efficiently, economically, and
expeditiously through the system. Issues presented for decision by the
immigration courts and on appeal are more readily narrowed. Simply put,
these observers argue, when aliens in proceedings or on appeal have legal
representation, the system works better.
30. See Avery, supra note 10, at 283. The current name of the organization is Informationsverbund
Asyl / ZDWF e.V. See InformationsverbundAsyl (visited May 21, 2000) <http://www.asyl.net>.
31. See Avery, supra note 10, at 284.
32. See Deutsches Haus, JUNGLE WORLD (Dec. 9, 1998) <http://www.nadir.org/nadir/periodika/
jungle world/_98/50/09b.htm>.
33. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment,
GA Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M.
1027 (1984), modified in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).




GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
In U.S. law, an alien placed in proceedings is guaranteed the privilege of
being represented by an attorney or other qualified legal representative, but at
no expense to the government.36 Senator Moynihan introduced a bill in
January 1999 that would pilot test a court-appointed counsel system for those
in removal proceedings.37 In arguing for the pilot, the Senator noted that the
current system has created great expense and delay for the federal govern-
ment because cases are often continued for lengthy periods while aliens try to
find pro bono counsel or counsel they can afford.3 8 The bill calls for a study
of the impact of representation at government expense on overall DOJ costs
in order to determine whether the program should be extended nationwide.
While the European systems also generally guarantee a right to legal
counsel at the claimant's expense,39 several states appoint lawyers to take up
cases at government expense. The Danish Refugee Appeals Board, for
example, does so.40 Legal aid has been available in a similar fashion at the
Refugee Appeals Commission in France since 1991.41 In the Netherlands and
Sweden, applicants are entitled to legal aid in the first instance. Where legal
aid is provided, however, free legal advice may be limited or the amount of
financial legal aid inadequate.43 The European Council on Refugees and
Exiles, an umbrella organization of refugee NGOs, advocates that legal aid
payments should reflect the time and disbursements required for competent
representation and be administered by a body independent of the executive
arm of government.4a
Despite the suggestive U.S. data noted above, we do not have a systematic
evaluation of the effect of representation on the asylum system. Such an
evaluation should be able to tell us whether and to what extent representation
facilitates the recognition of bona fide refugees, filters out weak cases, and
results in a more efficient and effective process for the government.
D. Guidelines
The changing nature of forced migrants has made it important for govern-
ments to provide guidance to asylum adjudicators on new developments.
Two particular developments have attracted both international and national
governmental attention.
36. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1996).
37. S. 173, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
38. 145 CONG. REC. S603 (1999) (statement of Senator Moynihan).
39. See Pieter Boeles & Ashley Terlouw, Minimum Guarantees for Asylum Procedures, 9 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 472, 481 (1997) (citing paragraph 13 of the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council's
"Resolution on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures" adopted in June 1995).
40. See UNHCR REGIONAL BUREAU FOR EUROPE, LEGAL FACT SHEETS ON ASYLUM PROCEDURES IN
WESTERN EUROPE 9 (1993).
41. See id. at 15.
42. See id. at 32,44.
43. See EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, supra note 14, 1 134.




Gender-based claims have been challenging adjudicators in the 1990s to
determine the extent to which various forms of harm suffered by women are
covered by the refugee definition. Gender-based fears of persecution range
from being stoned or burnt to death for not bringing enough dowry or for
choosing one's own husband to female genital mutilation. Decision-makers
have frequently encountered claims based on rape by military or paramilitary
personnel, often times outside the context of ethnic cleansing.
The European Parliament, followed by UNHCR in Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 39, has urged the recognition as a particular social group
"women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their
having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live.",45 In
October 1993, the UNHCR Executive Committee adopted Conclusion No.
73 on Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence.46 This recognizes that asylum
seekers who have suffered sexual violence should be treated with particular
sensitivity, and recommends the establishment of training programs designed
to ensure that those involved in the refugee status determination process are
adequately sensitized to issues of gender and culture.
In July 1991, UNHCR issued "Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee
Women.", 47 While these guidelines focused especially on protection issues
for refugee women in camps, they also addressed gender-related persecution
and recommended procedures to make the refugee adjudication process more
accessible to women. With respect to grounds for establishing refugee status,
the guidelines address three special issues of concern: the transgression of
social mores and persecution on account of social group; gender discrimina-
tion; and attacks on women by military personnel.48 As far as access to a
hearing is concerned, the guidelines discuss how women who arrive as part
of a family unit are sometimes not interviewed about their experiences, even
where they have been the targets of persecution. 49 Finally, the guidelines
focus on the special problems that women face in telling adjudicators about
various forms of sexual assault they may have suffered.5 °
Both Canada and the United States have adopted official guidelines on the
analysis of gender-related claims to asylum. The Canadian guidelines 5' were
45. Executive Committee Conclusion No. 39: Refugee Women and International Protection, UNHCR,
36th Sess. (1985).
46. See Executive Committee Conclusion No. 73: Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, UNHCR,
44th Sess. (1993).
47. Information Note on UNHCR's Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, UNHCR
Sub-Comm. of the Whole on Int'l. Protection, 42nd Sess., U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/67 (1991). Susan Martin
prepared the guidelines as a consultant for UNHCR.
48. See id. 91[ 54-56.
49. See id. 57.
50. See id. H 58-60.
51. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD (IRB), GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE CHAIRPERSON PURSUANT TO
SECTON 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT: WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED
PERSECUTION 1 (1993).
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promulgated in 1993 by the IRB, Canada's administrative adjudicatory body.
The U.S. guidelines 52 followed in 1995 and were produced by the Office of
International Affairs of the Immigration and Naturalization Service as a
memorandum for distribution to asylum officers. Both efforts were devel-
oped collaboratively after consultations with interested governmental and
non-governmental experts.53
The Canadian guidelines provide an analysis of four issues: (1) To what
extent can women making a gender-related claim of fear of persecution
successfully rely on any one, or combination, of the five enumerated grounds
of the Convention refugee definition? (2) Under what circumstances does
sexual violence, or a threat thereof, or other prejudicial treatment towards
women constitute persecution? (3) What are the key evidentiary elements
which decision-makers have to look to when considering a gender-related
claim? (4) What special problems do women face when called upon to state
their claim at refugee determination hearings, particularly when they have
had experiences that are difficult and often humiliating to speak about? The
Chairman of the IRB issued an update of the guidelines in 1996. 54
The U.S. guidelines examine the elements of the refugee definition with
respect to women's claims and discuss relevant case law. With respect to the
seriousness of the harm, the guidelines address sexual violence and violation
of fundamental beliefs as persecution. As U.S. law focuses special attention
on the "on account of" requirement, the guidelines consider actual or
imputed political opinion as well as membership in a particular social group,
defined by gender and by family membership. Finally, with regard to the role
of government, the memorandum looks at the government as persecutor or as
unable or unwilling to control the persecutor and the availability of protec-
tion elsewhere in the country.
2. Guidelines on Children's Asylum Claims
The international community has recognized that refugee children have
different requirements from adult refugees when they are seeking refugee
status. In 1996, Canada established special procedures to make the asylum
process sensitive to the unique needs of children. UNHCR published guidelines
on unaccompanied children seeking asylum in 1997, and the United States
issued guidelines for children's asylum claims on Human Rights Day in 1998.
In issuing Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues,55
the Canadian IRB became the first government agency adjudicating asylum
claims to address the ways in which children refugees are a particularly
vulnerable group. The guidelines acknowledge that children may not be able
52. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service, Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women 3 (1995).
53. See id.
54. IRB, WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION UPDATE (1996).
55. IRB, GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE CHAIRPERSON PURSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION
ACT: CHILD REFUGEE CLAIMANTS: PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 2 (1996).
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to articulate their claims to refugee status in the same way as adults, they
establish special procedures for adjudicating children's claims, and they
adopt the best interests of the child as the relevant standard for assessing a
child's claim. Specifically, the guidelines address the designation of a
representative and evidentiary issues. The IRB developed the guidelines after
consultation with international, national, local, and legal organizations in-
volved with refugee children.
In 1997, UNHCR published Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in
Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum.5 6 The purpose of
the guidelines was threefold: to increase awareness of the special needs of
unaccompanied children and the rights reflected in the Convention on the
Rights of the Child; 57 to highlight the importance of a comprehensive
approach to child refugee issues; and to stimulate discussion in each country
on how to develop principles and practices that will ensure that the needs of
unaccompanied children are being met.
Both the Canadian and UNHCR guidelines influenced the development of
the U.S. guidelines. Like their Canadian counterpart, the U.S. guidelines
developed out of a collaborative effort after consultations with interested
governmental and NGO experts, as well as with UNHCR. The INS guide-
lines recognize that "human rights violations against children can take a
number of forms, such as abusive child labor practices, trafficking in
children, rape, and forced prostitution.", 58 Special attention is paid to "child
soldiers," children under the age of fifteen who are recruited into military
operations. The guidelines also recognize that children experience persecu-
tion differently from adults and have special needs when it comes to
presenting testimony at the asylum interview. For years, States have been
criticized for running asylum systems where one size fits all.
The INS guidelines lay out procedural, evidentiary and legal standards that
take into account the limited capacity of a child to present an asylum claim,
while at the same time ensuring that the child's voice is heard throughout the
process. All asylum officers will receive training geared to help them use the
new guidelines and develop their awareness of children's and cultural
issues.59 The INS Resource Information Center (RIC) will also issue country
conditions information to inform asylum officers of the legal and cultural
situation of children in their countries of origin, on the incidence of
exploitation and other victimization, and on the adequacy of state protection
afforded to children. 60
56. UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IN DEALING WrM UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN
SEEKING ASYLUM (1997).
57. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49 at
167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989).
58. Memorandum from Jeff Weiss, Acting Director, Office of International Affairs, INS, Guidelines
For Children's Asylum Claims 1 (Dec. 10, 1998) (on file with the authors).
59. See id at 6.
60. See id at 16.
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To ensure that the child's best interests are met, the guidelines allow a
trusted adult to accompany and participate with the child at the asylum
interview.6' The guardian's role is to bridge the gap between the child's
culture and the asylum interview, to assist the child psychologically, and to
serve as a source of comfort and trust for the child. The guidelines encourage
the asylum officer to allow the trusted adult to help the child explain his or
her claim, and, at the same time, ensure that the child has the opportunity to
express him or herself. While the INS guidelines do not mandate the
appointment of a trusted adult, experts believe that the guardian role is
essential to make the asylum process work for the child. The Women's
Commission for Refugee Women and Children is asking the INS to develop a
corps of professionals with child welfare experience and familiarity with
children asylum seekers' cultures, to be lodged outside the INS with an
appropriate NGO or in another Justice Department branch.
The Executive Office for Immigration Review has not yet adapted the
guidelines to its own adjudication process, a potential problem, since many
children's cases are decided by immigration judges. Also, there are no
comparable guidelines for INS officers involved in other activities, such as
apprehension, investigations, detention, and removal, though such officers
have contact with children.
With regard to both the gender and children's guidelines, it would be
worthwhile to understand what effect these international and national guide-
lines have had on decision-making. To the extent that these guidelines could
be implemented more effectively, we should try to understand how that can
be accomplished. With respect to the children's guidelines, for example, it
would be useful to consider making the appointment of a guardian mandatory
and establishing a professional corps of such guardians, as proposed by the
Women's Commission. It would also be worth understanding whether the
immigration court, which decides the vast majority of asylum claims, should
adapt the guidelines to the hearing process.
III. DETERRING ABUSE
Most of the major asylum reforms in Western states have aimed at
deterring abuse. Many of these reforms have been quite controversial, from
expedited procedures to lengthy detention and safe third country policies.
A. Making the Regular Asylum System More Efficient
All the major receiving countries found themselves unprepared for large
numbers of asylum seekers in the 1980s. Without significant commitments of
staff and computer resources, the Western nations faced lengthy processing
times and large backlogs. These problems encouraged abuse and left the
public with the sense that the government was failing to deal with a major
61. See id. at 5.
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flow of asylum seekers. To address these problems, governments streamlined
processing and invested extensively in staff and computerization.
The first U.S. overhaul of the asylum system in 1990 established a
relatively small staff of asylum officers, despite the fact that this corps,
described above, inherited a considerable and rapidly growing backlog in
applications, dominated by Central Americans. On October 1, 1990, the INS
had a backlog of approximately 90,000 asylum claims. 62 The limited re-
sources of a small corps (about seventy-five to start) was simply not enough
to handle a burgeoning class of Central American asylum seekers, as well as
an emergency in the Caribbean (36,000 Haitian asylum seekers brought to
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in 1992),63 and the processing of employment
authorization requests for asylum seekers.64 By December 1994, when the
Department of Justice issued a final rule to implement a second set of
reforms,6 5 the backlog amounted to over 425,000 cases.66
The second reforms resulted in three important sets of changes. The first
involved the process itself. Previously, the asylum officer issued grants and
denials with explanations as to the rationale of the decision. Referral of the
denials to Immigration Court with a formal deportation charge was discretion-
ary. Under the 1995 reforms,67 the Asylum Corps role was considerably
streamlined. For those applicants who entered the United States illegally or
were otherwise out of status, the asylum officer could approve the claim
punctually or promptly refer it to an immigration judge for a final decision in
the course of what are now called "removal" hearings. The asylum officer
and immigration judge had to hear and decide claims within 180 days from
the date of filing.
The second major change de-linked work authorization from the asylum
application. Work permits could not be issued until the asylum officer or
immigration judge granted the claim, unless they were not able to make that
decision within the 180 day period. Finally, the Clinton Administration
proposed doubling the number of asylum officers and immigration judges.
European governments also invested significantly in staff, streamlining,
and computerization in the 1990s. According to one study, most countries
decreased the time required to process asylum applications in the first
instance from about ten months in 1989 to seven to eight months by 1994, but
the results varied from one month in the Netherlands and Austria to twelve
months in Germany.68 Of course, in 1989, it took twenty-four months for the
first decision in Germany. The United Kingdom's Asylum Division of the
62. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,780 (1994). A single claim often includes the principal applicant as well as
other family members.
63. See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, 1993 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 146.
64. See Beyer, supra note 12, at 50.
65. 59 Fed. Reg. 62,284 (1994).
66. See 71 INTERPRErER RELEASES 1578 (1994).
67. 59 Fed. Reg. 62,284 (1994).
68. See INTERNATIONAL CT. FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEV., THE KEY To EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF ENTRY AND ASYLUM POLICIES IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 78 (1994).
20001
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
Home Office increased staff (including administrative personnel) from 120 in
1991 to 723 in 1995.69 Despite these increases, the U.K. adjudicators are
facing considerable pressures from a rapid and significant flow of asylum
seekers in 1999.70
In 1998, some 366,000 asylum seekers lodged applications in Europe. In
FY 1998, about 36,000 asylum claims were filed in the U.S. (where each
claim may include more than one person).
These reforms should be evaluated to understand whether these changes
have resulted in systems with limited abuse that still ensure the recognition of
bona fide refugees. It would be particularly helpful to know what systems
best accomplish these goals. We should understand why some systems result
in significant numbers of asylum seekers who do not appear at their hearings.
We should also examine the effects of system incentives to show up for
hearings. For example, the Austrian model makes it possible to cut off social
assistance to those who do not appear. In the United States, adjudicators issue
final orders of removal to claimants who received notice of their asylum
hearing but do not appear.
B. Expedited Processing
The European nations were the first to create rapid asylum procedures.
These were aimed particularly at identifying "manifestly unfounded" appli-
cations at the airports and other ports of entry. By 1994, rapid procedures
were practiced in the major European countries.71
Applicants arriving from "safe states" (discussed more fully below) are
screened out of the regular asylum process and into an accelerated determina-
tion system. 72 In Germany, for example, the asylum seeker in this situation
has forty-eight hours to apply.7 3 Rejected asylum seekers are given three days
to file an appeal with an administrative court, but the courts are instructed to
grant a stay of deportation only in cases where there is a serious doubt as to
the legality of the measure. Following a negative decision, applicants are to
be swiftly deported back to the "safe states." In the United Kingdom, asylees
from "safe" countries are returned within twenty-four hours.7 4 In the Czech
Republic, asylum seekers are required to make an application within forty-
eight hours of entering the country.75
69. See Colin Harvey, Restructuring Asylum: Recent Trends in United Kingdom Asylum Law and
Policy, 9 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 60, 63 (1997).
70. See Martin Hickman, Over Ambitious Immigration Project Criticised as Backlog Mounts, Press
Assoc. News, Jan. 26, 2000 (regarding streamlined procedures established to handle a backlog of over
100,000 cases); Jo Butler, Number of Asylum Seekers at Record High, Press Assoc. News, Jan. 25, 2000
(noting that over 71,000 applications were received in the U.K. in 1999, compared to 46,000 in 1998).
71. See WALLACE, supra note 8, at 7; see also LAMBERT, supra note 23, at 21-27, 34-38 (describing
expedited asylum procedures in Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland)
72. See Kathleen Marie Whitney, Does the European Convention on Human Rights Protect Refugees
From Safe Countries?, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 375, 391 (1997).
73. See id.




In Germany, the airport procedure is completed within three days.7 6 Very
few asylum seekers are successful with this procedure. Nor are many
successful when applying at the border, particularly because of the safe third
country policy. Yet 99,000 asylum seekers lodged applications in Germany in
1998.77 In many cases, apparently, applicants tell the German authorities that
they do not know what route they took to reach the interior of Germany.
In the United States, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) 78 created an expedited removal proce-
dure upon entry. The 1996 legislation mandates the expedited removal of
individuals who are inadmissible because of certain forms of fraud, misrepre-
sentation or faulty documentation. Under the new procedures, individuals
who request asylum must demonstrate that they have a credible fear of
persecution in order to continue with their asylum application. 79 The law
anticipates that the "credible fear" determination will be made swiftly and
requires that the immigration judge's review of that determination be
completed in no more than one week.8°
The "credible fear" provisions were introduced in response to what
appeared to be abuse of the asylum system at airports of entry by individuals
who used fraudulent documents or destroyed the documents they had used to
board flights to the United States. During 1995 and 1996, however, signifi-
cant steps, such as sustained detention of such asylum seekers, were taken to
control this abuse of the asylum process. In FY 1996, about 3600 individuals
requested asylum at ports of entry.8'
A 1998 study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that
the number of asylum seekers subject to expedited removal remained
small (about 1400 in the first seven months of operation).82 Most importantly,
the GAO study showed that eighty-three percent of asylum seekers
demonstrated a credible fear of persecution and were allowed to proceed
through the normal process in immigration court. The new gatekeeping
process thus sends almost all asylum seekers through to regular asylum
hearings.
It would be very worthwhile understanding whether these expedited
procedures deter "manifestly unfounded" claims and whether they keep out
Convention refugees and others deserving of protection. An evaluation of
76. Wolfgang Bosswick, Asylum Policy in Germany, in EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION OF REFUGEES IN
CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 69-70 (Philip Muus ed., 1997).
77. UNHCR, Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR-1998 Statistical Overview, Global
Asylum Applications and refugee status determination, Table IVI (visited May 18, 2000) <http://
www.unhcr.ch/statist/98oview/tab4_l .htm>.
78. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
79. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(B)(iii)(I) (Supp. IV 1998).
80. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I1I), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(l)(B)(iii)(Im) (Supp. IV 1998).
81. See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, 1997 REFUGEE POLICY REPORT TO CONGRESS, U.S.
REFUGEE POLICY: TAKING LEADERSHIP 31 (1997).
82. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT No. GAO/GGD-98-81, ILLEGAL ALIENS: CHANGES IN THE
PROCESS OF DENYING ALIENS ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES 86 (1998).
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their cost effectiveness would be useful as well, particularly where most of
those screened are placed in regular asylum hearings.
C. Detention
In the asylum context, states use detention for two purposes: deterrence
and compliance. With regard to deterrence, officials see detention as a serious
disincentive to economic migrants who apply for asylum in order to gain
entry or remain in a Western nation. Compliance is usually thought of in
connection with the legal procedures of the asylum and removal systems:
appearing at hearings, and if denied, submitting to actual removal.
Just how detention should be used to accomplish these goals is the major
issue. Since the purpose of deterrence is to dissuade economic migrants from
abusing the asylum system, we should expect the detention policies to apply
to such migrants but not to asylum seekers with reasonable claims.
The role of detention with regard to compliance is more complex. Here
there may be a range of policies that would be effective in ensuring
appearance at hearings, for example. Detention may be appropriate for those
who do not have good claims or are deemed security or public safety risks.
For asylum seekers with legitimate claims, supervised release, an approach
more in keeping with the humanitarian nature of asylum, may result in
compliance at a much lower cost than detention. Supervised release also
allows governments to use detention space more efficiently.
What is occurring in practice? With respect to the detention of asylum
seekers who make their claims at ports of entry, the 1996 U.S. legislation
generally requires detention throughout the initial stages of consideration by
the inspector and asylum officer.83 The implementing regulations permit
release on parole, at the discretion of the District Director, of those who meet
expedited removal's "credible fear" standard.84 Claimants thus can be
released as they prepare for and undergo the full asylum hearing before an
immigration judge. In practice, some districts rarely release individuals who
have been found to have a credible fear, whereas others are more likely to do
so based on public safety and likelihood of absconding.85
With the introduction of expedited procedures for "manifestly un-
founded" and "safe third country" cases in Europe, there has been a rise in
the number of asylum seekers detained while awaiting a decision on their
admissibility to the determination procedures and/or to the territory of the
host country concerned. As in the United States, detention is not usually a
measure applied to in-country applicants, but is largely reserved for border
applicants in countries such as Austria, Belgium, Germany and the United
83. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (Supp. IV 1998).
84. 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,320 (1997).
85. KAREN MUSALO, ET AL. THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY: REPORT ON THE SECOND YEAR OF
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPEDrTED REMOVAL 35-36, 141(1999).
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Kingdom. In Austria and Germany, for example, approximately ninety
percent of asylum seekers enter by land from neighboring states, all of which
are designated "safe countries. ' ' 86 Pre-admission detention often focuses on
the need, due to a lack of documentation, to establish the asylum seeker's
identity or travel route.
With the exception of the United Kingdom and some parts of Austria,
detention during the full determination procedure (after a claim has been
determined to have some foundation and prior to the first rejection) is rare.87
With respect to pre-deportation detention, western European countries gener-
ally follow one of two models. Some detain individuals when the claim is
rejected in the first instance and while it is on appeal. They do so on the
suspicion that the rejected asylum seeker will abscond. Other countries
issue a compulsory exit order or pre-deportation reporting requirements
and then detain if these are disregarded. 88 The United States issues a "bag
and baggage" letter, commonly known as a "run" letter, to all individuals
with final removal orders. The INS does not generally make any effort to
locate and detain the ninety-five percent who do not comply with this exit
order.89
Conditions of detention have been widely criticized on both sides of the
Atlantic. Problems include mixing of asylum seekers with criminal detain-
ees, mixing children with adults, lack of access to relatives and counsel, and
substandard living conditions. Comprehensive standards regarding the treat-
ment of asylum seekers in detention do not exist.
The demand for and inefficient use of detention space led the INS to
contract with the Vera Institute of Justice in late 1996 to implement a
demonstration project aimed at increasing appearances in imnmigration
court and a more efficient use of detention. Vera is testing a
community supervision program to assess the impact of supervision on
appearance rates and compliance with the removal process, as well as
the cost-effectiveness of such a program. Their research report should be
issued towards the end of 1999, but preliminary data suggest that the
detention of those properly screened for supervision is not necessary to
ensure compliance with the removal process when appropriate supervision is
available.
It would be helpful to know whether detention deters abuse. With that goal
in mind, we should also learn what practices, if any, ensure that those
deserving protection are not detained. An evaluation of the best alternatives
to detention is sorely needed.
86. See Jane Hughes & Ophelia Field, Recent Trends in the Detention of Asylum Seekers in Western
Europe, in DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EUROPE: ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVES 5, 17 (Jane Hughes &
Fabrice Liebaut eds., 1998).
87. See id. at 22-23.
88. See id. at 23-24.
89. See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, 1997 REPORT TO CONGRESS, BECOMING AN AMERICAN:
IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 131 (1997).
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D. Safe Third Country and Safe Country of Origin
Most advanced Western nations have adopted the principle in their asylum
laws that the first safe haven country to which a refugee flees should be the
one in which he or she seeks asylum. This constrains the ability of asylum
seekers to choose their country of asylum application.
In Europe, arrangements are designed to prevent asylum seekers from
"shopping" for asylum: being denied in one place, then trying again
somewhere else. The Dublin Convention9° and Schengen Implementation
Treaty91 are two such agreements that identify the country responsible for
making the one and only asylum determihation on behalf of all signatories, a
determination that all other signatories then pledge to respect.
Many refugee advocates recommend a narrowing of any constraints
embodied in such multilateral agreements to limiting an applicant's asylum
status determination to the decision of the country of first application, not to
the country of first arrival. They note that asylum seekers may have relatives
or other good reasons or equities to apply in a particular country. The Dublin
Convention sets out several criteria for determining which state is respon-
sible for examining asylum applications and, importantly, prioritizes those
criteria. The order of responsibility is set out as follows:
1. The state where the applicant has a close family member with
recognized refugee status;
2. The state issuing a residence permit or enty visa, or if more than one,
the state issuing the permit or visa with the longest validity or the
latest expiration date.
3. If a transit visa was issued, the responsibility rests with either the
destination state or the state where the application is lodged, depend-
ing on particular circumstances.
4. In cases of demonstrable illegal entry, the first entry state will
usually be responsible unless an asylum application is made in
another state where the applicant stayed for longer than six months.
5. In cases of legal entry, the state that waived the requirement for a
visa.
6. If none of the above criteria apply, the state where the application is
lodged.
The asylum laws of Germany and Finland explicitly name the countries
considered as safe third countries.92 For Germany, all EU and EFTA states, as
90. Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Requests
Lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities, June 15, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 425 (1991).
91. Convention applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the
Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 84.
92. See § 26a Asylum Procedure Act of June 26, 1992, v. 1.7.1992 (BGBI. I S.1430) (Annex I)
(Germany); Nina Lassen & Jane Hughes eds., Danish Refugee Council, Safe Third Country Policies in
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well as Poland and the Czech Republic, are named.9 3 Most states provide
general criteria for assessing whether a third country is to be considered as a
safe country or not. Austrian law states that all countries which apply the
Refugee Convention are to be considered safe third countries.94
The issue that the safe third country principle has raised in Europe is
whether the countries to the immediate east of the EU provide for full and fair
asylum determinations. With a broader law such as the Austrian one, that
issue extends further. Over 130 nations have signed the Convention or the
Protocol, including Rwanda and Yugoslavia.
In the United States, the 1995 administrative reforms granted the Attorney
General the discretion to deny asylum if the claimant can be returned to a
country: (1) through which he traveled en route to the United States; (2) in
which he would have access to a full and fair procedure for determining his
claim; (3) in which the alien would not face harm or persecution; and (4)
which has a bilateral or multilateral arrangement with the United States.95
The 1996 law included a similar provision prohibiting asylum applications
from those who can be returned to a safe third country pursuant to a bilateral
agreement. 96 The United States and Canada initiated negotiations to create
such an agreement before the 1996 law was enacted. The asylum changes in
that law raised questions on the Canadian side regarding full and fair
procedures, and the negotiations have not gone forward since that time.
In order to facilitate the scrutiny of manifestly unfounded asylum claims,
some countries have established the concept of safe countries of origin.
Switzerland and Germany pioneered this concept in 1990 and 1992, respec-
tively. When they were first created, both sets of laws explicitly named
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Senegal, and the Slovak Republic.97
The United Kingdom streamlined processing in May 1995 for asylum
applicants from certain states: Ghana, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland,
Romania and Uganda.98 Under this pilot, applicants were interviewed at the
time of application and required to make further representations within a
five-day period, after which a decision was taken. Since November 1995, the
pilot has been extended to include a larger group of states and has been
applied as well at some ports of entry. The refusal rate is almost 100%: by the
end of June 1996, there were 5735 refusals, 3 grants, and 996 pending
cases.
99
European Countries 2 (last modified Jan. 14 1998) <http://www.drc.dk/eng/pub/safe3rd/finland.html>
(Finland).
93. § 26a Asylum Procedure Act, supra note 92.
94. See WALLACE, supra note 8, at 74.
95. See 59 Fed. Reg. 62,284 (1994).
96. See INA § 208(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
97. See GuY GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 348, nn. 98-99 (2nd ed. 1998)
98. See id.
99. See id. at 64 n. 17.
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We should examine whether safe third country and safe country of origin
policies have deterred "asylum shopping" and other forms of abuse. We
should also understand the extent to which these policies have resulted in the
return of refugees to countries where they did not have access to asylum.
Finally, we should examine the standards used to select safe third countries
and safe countries of origin.
IV. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Most Western asylum systems permit varying degrees of review of the
initial asylum decision. Many have recently imposed restrictions on such
review in certain cases. The review function is also being streamlined in
order to address large caseloads.
The 1996 U.S. law, for example, made the immigration court the final
arbiter of the merits in credible fear proceedings.' 0 0 These determinations are
not appealable to the BIA or the federal courts. In addition, IIRIRA made the
Attorney General, which in most cases means the immigration court and the
BIA, the final arbiter of determinations regarding several new provisions
restricting eligibility for relief: safe third countries, the one-year filing
deadline, and changed conditions.' 0 '
In enacting these provisions, Congress thought that a somewhat swifter
removal process with fewer levels of review would result in the removal of
those who do not qualify for relief. While anecdotal evidence is available to
support the concern that some applicants abuse the system by prolonging
their appeals, no systematic empirical study has ever reached such a conclu-
sion.
The current bottleneck in the U.S. system lies with the BIA, which reviews
the immigration judge decisions. Both are part of the Department of Justice's
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). EOIR issued a proposed
rule in September 1998 to permit the BIA to affirm immigration judge orders
(including orders removing aliens) by the decision of a single BIA member,
without any opinion. '
0 2
The proposal came as the BIA attempts to deal with a burgeoning caseload
and significant backlog. In 1984, the BIA received less than 3000 cases and
consisted of five members. In 1994, it received more than 14,000 cases. 10 3 The
next year, the Attorney General increased the BIA's size to twelve members, and
in 1996 to fifteen members. In 1997, more than 25,000 new appeals were filed.'1
4
The public comments filed in response to the proposal included alternative
ways that the BIA could deal with the increased caseload and backlog.
10 5
100. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(m), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(lII) (Supp. IV 1998).
101. See INA §§ 208(a)(2)(A), (B), (D), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(A), (B), (D) (Supp. IV 1998).
102. See 63 Fed. Reg. 49,043 (1998).
103. See id at 49,043-49,044.
104. See id.
105. See 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135, 56,137-56,141 (1999).
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Many commenters noted that the "summary affirmance" proposal combined
two very different streamlining methods: eliminating written decisions in
many cases, and substituting single members for three-judge panels in such
cases. These commenters argued that written decisions are central to appel-
late deliberation and urged EOIR to continue the practice of providing a
statement of reasons that addresses the appellant's contentions. In the interest
of streamlining the appellate process, they suggested that the statement of
reasons need not be elaborate with a full statement of facts, analysis of the
law, and citations to authority. The most important aspect of the decision,
they argued, was addressing the appellant's contentions, or in the case of
unrepresented aliens, any obvious errors. To further address the need for
streamlining, commenters also suggested that individual members be assigned to
decide each case. If the case appeared to the single member to be of considerable
significance, the member could ask that members consider the matter jointly.
EOIR issued a final rule in October 1999.106 The final rule states that the
BIA reviews a significant number of cases in which the decision under appeal
is correct and will not be changed on appeal. According to the new rule, an
affirmance without opinion will be issued only if the result below was
correct, any errors in the decision below were harmless or immaterial, and
either the issues in the case are controlled by precedent or the factual or legal
issues raised are so insubstantial that a three-member panel review is not
warranted. The streamlined procedure, says EOIR, will promote fairness by
enabling the BIA to render decisions in a more timely manner, while allowing
it to concentrate its resources primarily on those cases in which the decision
under appeal may be incorrect, or in which a new or significant legal or
procedural issue is presented.
Germany and France provide the two different types of review generally
found in Europe. In Germany, asylum applicants are entitled to appeal their
claim to a single judge of the German Administrative Court.10 7 German
administrative court judges are appointed for life and thus have a certain
degree of independence. The judges are selected and promoted to higher
courts by the Minister of Justice, making some observers question their
degree of independence.' 0 8 The court system is largely decentralized, and
administrative courts are established in each Land (state or province).
Appeals of an administrative court decision are dealt with by a higher
administrative court. Like in other civil law countries, there is no rule of
binding precedence. In practice, however, lower courts tend to respect
decisions of higher courts, particularly recent ones.' 0 9
The French appellate commission, the Commission de Recours des Refu-
gies, reviews negative determinations made by OFPRA. An independent
106. Id.
107. See LAMBERT, supra note 23, at 52.
108. See id. at 53.
109. See id.
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administrative authority, the Commission sits in a panel of three members
composed of a judge, a member of the board of OFPRA, and a representative
of UNHCR. The judge who chairs the panel may be a member of the Conseil
d'Etat, the Cour des Comptes, an administrative appeal court, or an adminis-
trative tribunal. 1 0 The Commission commonly questions appellants and has
the power to ask for supplementary information. Its decision is communi-
cated to the appellant and to OFPRA.111
In several nations, including Germany, the United Kingdom and France,
rejected asylum seekers from "safe" states cannot-remain in the countries to
which they fled pending appeal. Effectively, this may very well deny such
claimants the right to appeal.
1 12
We should consider what kind of independent review is appropriate for the
asylum system. It would be helpful to understand the extent to which courts
are necessary to ensure such independence. We should also examine what the
best models are today.
V. RETURN MECHANISMS
States can afford to be more generous in providing protection up front if
they return those determined to be ineligible or no longer eligible for
protection at the back end of the process; so runs a common argument. The
issue concerns both failed asylum seekers as well as those provided tempo-
rary protection.
Return mechanisms, to the extent used, vary significantly. Some countries
have tried assisted return to help failed asylum seekers reintegrate in their
home countries. In other instances, officials in certain European countries
have used unacceptable force when returnees resist deportation. Finally, the
United States generally does not return failed asylum seekers.
Several European nations, including Germany and Switzerland, have
assisted failed asylum seekers in their return by providing them with
assistance once they reach their home country. The model is a voluntary one,
where the host country pays the cost of return travel, provides a small amount
of money for the trip as well as some in-kind goods, and sends a more
significant amount of funds after verifying in the home country that the
individual is there. Both Germany and Switzerland have done this with the
assistance of the International Organization for Migration with respect to
select countries of origin. Have these programs been successful in reintegrat-
ing? Have many who received this type of assistance returned to the country
that rejected their asylum application or to other European countries?
On the other extreme, several deaths have been incurred in Europe by the
use of force in deporting failed asylum seekers who resist return. While no
110. See id.at 58.
11. See id. at 60.
112. See Whitney, supra note 72, at 392.
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one finds this acceptable, these events continue to occur. What are the
appropriate procedures to use in the event of resistance?
In the United States, as indicated above, many asylum seekers who, at the
end of the day, are denied any form of relief, are never returned to their home
country. The INS does not consider the removal of failed asylum seekers a
high priority. The INS interior enforcement strategy focuses on activities
such as removing criminal aliens, disrupting alien smuggling operations, and
minimizing document fraud.1 13 Does this undermine efforts to demonstrate
that the United States is serious in its commitment to a credible asylum
system?
In approaching the removal of failed asylum seekers, it is important to
distinguish between two categories of individuals denied relief. Some appli-
cants are seeking a way to stay in the United States for economic reasons
primarily. Others may not have a fear of persecution, but they may have fled
from serious civil strife. As discussed below, the Attorney General only
designates temporary protection for certain countries; thus some portion of
rejected asylum seekers in the United States are likely not to have any
protection available if they are fleeing serious violence. Return to conditions
of serious violence would be inappropriate for them.
With regard to economic migrants, removal is a question of INS enforce-
ment priority and capability. Since it has never been done, we do not know
what the effect would be. If they knew that they would be removed, perhaps it
would deter those who have no valid claim for protection. But even if such a
deterrent effect could not be empirically demonstrated, the policy may be
important enough simply because it goes to the integrity of the protection
system: ensuring that the system is not abused so that the public supports it in
time of need (which is all too constant).
VI. SCOPE OF THE REFUGEE CONCEPT
What does the Convention definition of a refugee mean as we close the
twentieth century? Given the vast changes in forced migration over the last
two decades, we should consider just how well a definition created in 1951
addresses an age when the agents of persecution may be a non-state actor or a
spouse abuser. Moreover, since civilians fleeing serious danger have become
so commonplace among forced migrants, we should also understand how
governments treat such individuals in contrast to those who flee persecution.
A. Non-State Actors
One of the marked substantive law disagreements among states concerns
the agents of persecution. The Convention definition does not explicitly
113. See INS, Strengthening the Nation's Immigration System, FACT SHEEr (visited Mar. 13, 2000)
<http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/factsheets/summfs.htm>; News Release: INS En-
hances Interior Enforcement Strategy; Plans Deployment of New FY 1999 Resources (visited Mar. 13,
2000) <http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/qrt.htm>.
20001
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
resolve this dispute, as it neither states who a refugee must be persecuted by,
nor explains what it means for the refugee to be "unable" to avail herself of
the protection of her country.
The problem emerges in two important contexts. First, this issue arises
with respect to the common situation of internal conflict whereby non-state
actors, asserting themselves like the state, persecute certain citizens. U.S. and
Canadian refugee law, for example, define agents of persecution to include
forces the state cannot or will not control."14 German courts, however, have
interpreted the definition narrowly, excluding the acts of the Taliban, for
example, in Afghanistan. 115 EU countries have declined to recognize state
responsibility where failure of protection is not deliberate, but follows from
the absence of an effective national authority from which to seek protection,
or simply from inability or lack of resources to effectively respond to the
protection needs of its citizens.1
16
The second context concerns violence against women by private citizens.
In such cases, the state allows private persons or groups to act freely and with
impunity to the detriment of rights recognized by the international human
rights regime.
Given that states are interpreting the same international law, the integrity
of the law would be best served if a mechanism could be developed that
would resolve such fundamental disputes over the meaning of the refugee
definition. We should consider what possible mechanisms could accomplish
that task.
B. Past Persecution
In incorporating the Convention definition into a domestic statute, the
United States decided to recognize refugee status when one is outside the
country of origin "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion.''1 7 The central question in the Convention definition and in most
countries' refugee law, however, relates to the fear of future persecution.
Decision makers thus focus on trying to determine what is likely to happen to
the individual in the future if she returns to the home country.
A leading U.S. jurist, Judge Posner, discussed the relationship between
past and future persecution as follows:
If... the ultimate issue is what will happen to the alien when he is
deported, one may wonder why past persecution figures at all in the
114. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEES 132 (1991).
115. Interviews by Susan Martin with officials from the German Federal Office for the Recognition of
Foreign Refugees (June 23, 1998).
116. See Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Failure of State Protection Within the Context of the Convention
Refugee Regime with Particular Reference to Gender-Related Persecution, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 53, 78
(1997).
117. INA§ 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 101 (a)(42)(A) (1994).
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decisional process. Why isn't the orientation of the inquiry entirely
forward-looking? The answer is twofold. The past is sufficiently predic-
tive of the future to warrant a shifting of the burden of production. But
... the past has an additional significance, independent of prediction
and therefore not necessarily affected by a demonstration that the alien
is in no danger of being persecuted in the future. The experience of
persecution may so sear a person with distressing association with his
native country that it would be inhumane to force him to return there,
even though he is in no danger of further persecution. Very few of the
surviving German Jews returned to Germany after the destruction of the
Nazi regime, and it would have been cruel to force them to do so on the
ground that bygones are bygones.1 8
One way in which this humanitarian concept impacts actual refugees
occurs in the U.S. overseas resettlement program. The United States has been
resettling Bosnian refugees who suffered serious past persecution. Most of
these refugees had been granted temporary protection by Germany. When
Germany terminated temporary protection and initiated repatriations, the
United States offered to resettle those Bosnians who had actually suffered
persecution in the forced labor camps, by rape, or through other serious harm.
That program continues today.
We should consider whether past persecution should be established as an
international standard.
C. Temporary Protection
How does the asylum system deal with those who flee danger rather than
persecution? Many advanced Western countries provide temporary protec-
tion or some other temporary status to individuals in such circumstances.
Generally, this is done outside of the asylum decision.
Should these protection decisions be made in the same process? To begin
to answer this question, it is helpful to note the differences between
temporary protection in Europe and the United States. In many European
countries, temporary protection is the initial type of protection offered to both
Convention refugees and those fleeing serious danger in mass migration
emergencies. Those who receive temporary protection generally cannot
apply for asylum until temporary protection is terminated.
The U.S. approach is quite different. Asylum is always available, but the
U.S. temporary protection system is a limited version that only applies to
nationalities designated by the Attorney General and to individuals who
happen to be in the United States at the time that their country is so
designated. Thus, some portion of rejected asylum seekers in the United
States are likely not to have any protection available if they are fleeing
118. Skalak v. INS, 944 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir. 1991).
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serious violence. Elsewhere, we have proposed a coordinated asylum/
temporary protection system to address this problem in the United States. " 9
A fuller discussion of the implementation of temporary protection policies
in Europe and North America is found in the report on a German Marshall
Fund workshop on the subject held in Washington, D.C. in March 1999.120
VII. SOCIAL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT
What are the appropriate rights and benefits that states should provide to
asylum seekers and asylees? During the period of application, these policies
must balance the responsibility to treat bona fide refugees with dignity and
respect and the need to limit the incentives to apply for those who are not
genuine. Post-approval policies, on the other hand, need to address issues
regarding the integration of refugees into the host society.
With respect to asylum seekers, both Europe and the United States limit
rights and benefits during the process. Most European countries provide
basic social support (food and shelter) for the period of the asylum applica-
tion. Some, such as Germany, distribute asylum seekers throughout the
country so as not to create any uneven cost for particular localities. Several
European countries keep asylum seekers in centers during the application
process, which effectively limits their movement in the host society. Family
reunion is generally not permitted until an asylum application is approved.
The United States provides no assistance whatsoever to the asylum seeker
during the period of application. As noted above, this is a change from when
asylum seekers were able to receive work authorization based on the
application. Now, work authorization generally comes only after the ap-
proval. Asylees in the United States are also eligible for certain welfare
benefits, though usage is relatively low. This may be in part because the
asylees had to survive during the application period by working, even if the
government did not authorize it. Recognized refugees are allowed to bring
their family to the United States. As to language learning, there are special
funds for language courses through the Office of Refugee Resettlement.
These are designed for refugees resettled from overseas, but asylees are
eligible as well.
With respect to longer-term integration, the Refugee Convention encour-
ages, but does not require, the naturalization of refugees. 121 U.S. law permits
asylees to become legal permanent residents one year after their asylum
application is approved.' 22 That year counts toward the five years generally
required for naturalization. European practice is varied. The requirements
119. See Susan Martin et al., Temporary Protection: Towards A New Regional and Domestic
Framework, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 543 (1998).
120. Nadia Yakoob, Workshop Report, Report on the Workshop on Temporary Protection: Compara-
tive Policies and Practices, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 617 (1999).
121. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 176 (art. 34).
122. See INA § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (Supp. IV 1998).
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range from as little as two years to as many as eight to ten years for obtaining
citizenship.
We should understand the extent to which access to social welfare or
asylum acts as a magnet for abuse. We also need to examine how efforts to
contain any such abuse serve to inhibit the integration of recognized
refugees. Where the adjudication of asylum claims takes a long time, we
should consider whether it is appropriate to keep close family members
separate.
VIII. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION
Most states are finding it necessary to work with other states when
managing the protection process. How will the new arrangements affect the
balance of protection and control?
Multilateral cooperation is most advanced in Europe. In fact, the harmoni-
zation of asylum procedures has comprised an important part of the European
integration process. The Schengen Implementation Agreement, which was
signed in 1990 and entered into force in 1995, sought to pinpoint responsibil-
ity for handling individual asylum claims and thus avoid "asylum shopping."
Several European states adopted this agreement in large part to create a
check-free zone for their nationals.
The Dublin Convention, which also was signed in 1990 and entered into
force in 1997, brought all the EU member states into agreement on which
member state would be responsible for handling a particular claim. This
agreement establishes more detailed criteria for determining state responsibil-
ity, including the presence of close relatives with refugee status, issuance of a
residence permit, visa or transit visa, point of illegal entry, and visa waiver. If
none of these criteria apply, the state in which the asylum application was
lodged is responsible.
In the Americas, much of the multilateral discussion has addressed
common enforcement issues, particularly with regard to smuggling. Perhaps
the most interesting bilateral development in the Americas was the attempt
by Canada and the United States to establish an agreement on the adjudica-
tion of asylum requests. In general, most observers see the Canadian asylum
system as being somewhat more generous than the U.S. system. When
Congress added restrictive provisions to the U.S. asylum system as discussed
above, the Canadians, already concerned about the differences between the
U.S. and Canadian systems, recognized that an agreement as to who would
have primary responsibility for which asylum seekers would be difficult to
achieve.
We need to examine the effects of these bilateral and multilateral develop-
ments on the asylum practice. We should consider which developments, if
any, best balance the dual goals of protection and control. Finally, we should
understand the extent to which courts affect bilateral and multilateral policies
and practices.
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IX. DATA AND EVALUATION
The statistics presently kept by governments on their asylum systems
answer one of the hotter political questions for nations that have experienced
significant surges and major backlogs: how many new applications are filed?
Governments also know trends in terms of source countries.
Most governments cannot tell their publics, though, just how well or
poorly their asylum system is doing. In the conclusion below, we suggest the
type of information that would allow analysts to measure the successes and
failures of the asylum systems. A useful recommendation by this workshop
would be to identify the appropriate measures for sound evaluation of the
asylum systems and to urge governments to collect and publish the data
needed for such measures.
X. CONCLUSION
Information on the following topics would enable governments to measure
the successes and failures of their asylum systems:
1. Barriers to the asylum system that prevent bona fide refugees from
seeking asylum.
2. Weaknesses in the asylum system that permit mala fide applicants to
gain access.
3. The accuracy of status determination decisions, and the degree to
which review ensures accuracy.
4. The extent to which most individuals who flee persecution or serious
danger find some type of protection.
5. The degree to which detention is effective in deterring abuse and
ensuring compliance without penalizing bona fide refugees, and an
assessment of better alternatives to accomplish these policy goals.
6. The extent to which failed asylum seekers are returned, and the best
models to assist returnees (whether failed asylum seekers or those
provided temporary protection who can return in safety and dignity)
to reintegrate in their home countries.
7. The degree to which (a) social and employment rights provided to
asylum seekers encourage abuse and (b) efforts to contain such
abuse by limiting such rights serve to inhibit the integration of
recognized refugees.
8. Improvements in the asylum systems resulting from bilateral and
multilateral cooperation among States, and models of cooperation
that best serve the dual goal of protection and control.
To stimulate this assessment process, this workshop brought together
scholars and experts from Europe and North America. Participants came
from government, academia, and NGOs. In addition to participating in the
meetings, several participants prepared papers on specific issues.
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Two participants wrote about the importance of access to a fair process. In
"An Asylum Seeker's Bill of Rights in a Non-Utopian World," Stephen
Legomsky identifies the basic elements of a fair adjudication procedure,
including the need for an independent adjudicator. Professor Legomsky also
describes the modem trend in North America and Western Europe to
discourage or bar selected categories of asylum seekers from gaining access
to the determination system. Sabine Weidlich analyzes the problems in
bypassing the safeguards of an in-depth interview in "First Instance Asylum
Proceedings in Europe: Do Bona Fide Refugees Find Protection?" Her paper
explores the challenges decision-makers face in judging the likelihood that
an individual will experience future persecution, particularly given the
limited types of evidence they consider.
Christopher Stone writes about the latest developments with regard to
alternatives to detention. He reports on the successful results of the Vera
Institute demonstration project testing a community supervision program that
aims for compliance with the adjudicatory and administrative removal
process as well as a more efficient and humane use of detention space.
On temporary protection, Matthew Gibney assesses what return in safety
and dignity means for those who have held this humanitarian status. At the
workshop, Joan Fitzpatrick presented an analysis of legal standards that
should govern the determination that forced migrants no longer need protec-
tion and return can begin. Her paper has already been published in a previous
issue of the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal.
1 23
In his paper on "Economic and Social Rights of Refugees and Asylum
Seekers in Europe," Ryszard Cholewinski examines these issues for Western,
Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia, Belarus and Ukraine). He
particularly focuses on health, housing, social assistance, education and
employment rights under international refugee law and international human
rights law. John Fredriksson analyzes the U.S. approach to the social and
economic rights of refugees and explains, in particular, the history of the U.S.
reliance on the private sector for the provision of social services.
Discussing European cooperation on asylum in "Asylum Policy in the
European Union" Randall Hansen explains how two accords with very
similar origins and philosophies resulted in very different outcomes from the
governmental point of view: the Schengen acquis a broad success, the Dublin
Convention a relative failure.
These papers follow. The final article is a summary report that outlines the
major points of discussion and the areas of consensus at the Workshop and
identifies the issues in need of further information and analysis. That report
concludes with several recommendations.
123. Joan Fitzpatrick, The End of Protection: Legal Standards for Cessation of Refugee Status and
Withdrawal of Temporary Protection, 13 GEo. IMMIoR. L.J. 343 (1999).
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